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Abstract
Although the anticipated ‘end of cheap oil’ has boosted the in-
terest in energy effi  ciency as a cornerstone of energy and cli-
mate strategies, it is usually taken into account on the basis 
of rather narrowly defi ned cost-benefi t considerations. As a 
consequence, substantial ancillary benefi ts are usually barely 
considered.
In a recent study for the European Parliament (EP), the au-
thors assessed two enhanced climate strategies compared to a 
more conventional strategy. One enhanced climate policy sce-
nario relies, in particular, on raising the annual pace of energy 
effi  ciency improvement. Th e other aims at a radical boost of the 
market share of renewable energy forms, which, however, pre-
supposes an equally radical improvement of energy effi  ciency.
Th e present article presents the scenario results and places 
them in the context of risk characterisation of the considered 
climate policy scenarios. Risks of international turmoil and en-
ergy price hikes could be reduced if dependency rates for fossil 
fuel imports went down. A more ambitious climate policy can 
also strengthen the EU position in post-Kyoto global climate 
agreements and a moderated need for emission trading can, 
for example, reduce confl icting pressures on clean technology 
transfer. 
On the other hand, the implementation of the effi  ciency 
strategy will entail increased domestic risks because it will in-
volve a re-prioritisation of resource allocation and will thus af-
fect the current distribution of wealth in both the energy sector 
and some other closely related sectors.
Th e article outlines the main drivers behind the ambitious 
energy effi  ciency scenario and it attaches tentative price tags 
to the ancillary eff ects, with special emphasis on the above 
sketched swapping of risks. It will, therefore, strongly argue for 
a more holistic view, which underscores the need for political 
action and the benefi ts of such proactive policies in favour of 
energy effi  ciency.
Introduction 
Th e era of cheap conventional energy resources seems to be 
coming to an end (e.g. ASPO, 2006; Bentley, 2006). Th is means 
that maintaining reliable supply levels requires signifi cant 
and timely investments in new and more expensive oil and 
gas production facilities. Th is will put increased pressure on 
world market prices for oil, gas and, to a lesser extent, coal. In 
turn, these changes are expected to have noticeable, detrimen-
tal impacts on economic development in a business-as-usual 
context. Furthermore, the geographical concentration of oil 
and gas resources, combined with large, emerging, oil import-
ing economies (i.e. China, India) can be expected to intensify 
international competition for market access to the declining 
resources. Last but not least, history teaches us that intensifying 
competition for strategic energy resources oft en has adverse 
eff ects on geopolitical stability, which, in turn, tends to slow 
down global economic development.
In addition to these strategic energy availability issues, cli-
mate change has emerged as a second challenge. It requires 
very substantial reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions, 
which essentially boils down to using less energy and switching 
to carbon neutral energy carriers. Since there is a growing sense 
of urgency with respect to realising fundamental changes in the 
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global primary energy mix in order to avoid dangerous levels 
of climate changes, the analysis of energy supply strategies and 
climate policy strategies has become heavily intertwined. In 
this context, the risks of not achieving the necessary emission 
reductions (in time) must be pondered alongside the risks of 
huge, ineff ective energy investments and/or of large realloca-
tions of wealth in societies.
Traditionally, energy strategies generally tend to stress sup-
ply side solutions, which, due to scale economies, oft en also 
entail some degree of centralised production. Th e BAU sce-
nario, by and large, follows that pattern, despite enhanced at-
tention to energy effi  ciency. Such an approach oft en results in 
somewhat lower macro-economic cost in the short and me-
dium-term. However, given the expected far reaching emission 
reductions, it is not necessarily economically advantageous in 
the long-term due to a lack of new (yet to be developed) clean 
technologies and the larger implied dependence on both fossil 
fuel imports and global emission trading. In the long run, this 
is probably not only more costly, but also makes the European 
(and the global) economy more sensitive to price shocks, fossil 
fuel supply disruptions and geopolitical turmoil linked to safe-
guarding fossil fuel supplies. Th e Nuclear+ & Carbon dioxide 
Capture and Storage (N+ & CCS) variant of BAU aims to ease 
the pressures by means of supply side solutions, but it has only 
a limited potential to do so.
Th e EE scenario tries to create larger markets for innovative 
energy saving technologies and for renewable energy technol-
ogy (e.g. seasonal heat storage in the built environment). In the 
RE scenario, apart from a strong boost of the deployment of 
renewable energy technology, energy savings are further inten-
sifi ed. In both scenarios, the future supply of new, low-carbon 
technologies is well facilitated, and at the same time, decreases 
dependency on fossil fuel imports and global emission trad-
ing1. Th e higher development and deployment costs through 
2020 enable a larger technology transfer base aft er 2020, with 
a diminished need for tradable permits than in BAU. Conse-
quently, overall energy and climate strategy cost developments 
are milder in the long run, while volatility is also reduced. 
Th is paper argues that, in comparison to BAU, the EE (and 
especially the RE) scenario clearly mitigates the external threats 
of economic volatility and geopolitical turmoil but, on the other 
hand, imposes greater challenges with respect to the manage-
ment of the more radical changes inside domestic European 
society (i.e. the EU and its Member States). Th e paper contends 
that it may well be worth weighing in these risks when compar-
ing strategies as a part of a more enriched social cost-benefi t 
analysis (i.e. including ancillary environmental benefi ts).
1. In BAU, the larger use of global emission trade initially implies lower cost, but is 
later confronted with higher costs due to a lack of new technologies. New technolo-
gies (after 2020) need to be transferred to e.g. CDM countries and then be used 
to create more tradable permits. This would mean that permit prices in BAU rise 
sharply after 2020 and than, with considerable delay, incite new energy technology 
development. In EE, the higher development and deployment cost through 2020 
enable a larger technology transfer base after 2020, with the need for tradable 
permits smaller than in BAU (but still substantial). Consequently, cost develop-
ments in EE are milder in the long run and volatility is reduced. 
A sustainable energy scenario for the EU 
METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE OF THE SCENARIO ANALYSIS
Th e so-called ‘two degree target’2 implies that risk and uncer-
tainty are no longer symmetric. In hindsight, fi ft y years from 
now, the EU member countries might decide that a slightly less 
heft y pace of change would have suffi  ced, which, in strategy 
analysis, may be regarded as ‘regret cost’. If, however, fi ft y years 
from now, the EU member countries have to acknowledge that 
climate change has not been contained suffi  ciently, it would 
entail a more serious regret cost. Th is justifi es a tightening of 
measures in the EU as part of a global transformation aiming 
at a sustainable low carbon economy3. 
Even though the Stern report may have produced rather 
optimistic cost-benefi t ratios with respect to early action to 
prevent larger damage later4, it still provides a good basis for 
the development of early action strategies. It shows that global 
emissions trading is an important instrument, but that it needs 
adjacent policies in order to ensure a long-term supply and the 
global spread of low and non-carbon technologies. An emis-
sion abatement strategy that stresses short-term and medium-
term cost minimisation runs the risk of maximising the use of 
emission trading (EU ETS, CDM, etc.) without ensuring that 
new technologies can gradually build up a track record. Th e 
latter is needed to enable emissions reductions against aff ord-
able cost in later stages of the transition towards a sustainable 
economy. A long-term, continued supply of such technologies 
requires a set of policies that incites suffi  cient and eff ective re-
search, development, and deployment of renewable energy and 
energy saving technologies. 
A set of scenarios was specifi ed for the EU25 that covered al-
ternative strategies and targets indicated by the European Par-
liament Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). 
Based on recent work for the European Commission (see be-
low), the alternatives represent a range of strategic technology 
choices as compared to a reference (BAU) scenario, including 
more or less nuclear, carbon-dioxide capture and storage, en-
hanced energy effi  ciency, increased use of CHP and maximisa-
tion of the use of renewable energy sources. Altogether, fi ve dif-
ferent scenarios were developed (Lechtenböhmer et al., 2006). 
Th e analysis was based on two main sources. Th e basic data, 
economic assumptions and the main results for the BAU sce-
nario were derived from the latest available EU energy and 
transport projections (Decker 2006, Mantzos 2006, Mantzos & 
Capros 2006). Demand-side projections and analyses of higher 
penetrations of energy effi  ciency and renewable energies were 
derived from a recent scenario analysis by the Wuppertal In-
2. Average global temperature rise of more than 2 degrees centigrade is assumed 
to signifi cantly increase risks for more serious damage due to climate change as 
well as for irreversible phenomena with grave effects (e.g. release of methane due 
to vanishing of permafrost). 
3. Some argue that it doesn’t pay off for the EU to be in the driver’s seat of this 
global change process. The prevailing view among specialists has been that the 
realisation of the Kyoto Protocol and the current post-Kyoto investigations essen-
tially depend on the role of the EU as trail blazer. Admittedly, neither this majority 
view nor views that call for a more cautious strategy can be evidenced with socio-
economic simulations. They can only be argued. 
4. There are publicly available (but mostly not peer reviewed) reviews from, among 
others, Nordhaus, Tol, Dasgupta, and Varian. Even though there are indications 
that some of the criticism, e.g. regarding discounting, is based on misunderstand-
ings, the overall judgement is that, due to various key choices, a rather favourable 
cost-benefi t ratio for early action (as central estimate) has been produced.
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stitute (Lechtenböhmer et al. 2005a/b). Th e quantifi cation and 
combination of potentials, costs, strategies, policies and meas-
ures, and the calculation of scenarios have been carried out 
using the Wuppertal Scenario modelling system.
DESCRIPTION OF CORE CONTENTS OF THE SCENARIOS
In order to draw diff erent possible futures of the EU energy 
system, fi ve exemplary scenarios were designed according to 
the defi nitions requested by the EP. In table 1, four scenarios 
are shown: BAU and N+ & CCS (a variant of BAU with extra 
nuclear and CO2 capture and storage) as well as two alterna-
tives, the Energy Effi  ciency (EE) and the Renewable Energy 
(RE) scenario. 
In the business as usual (BAU) scenario, which has been 
developed to be compatible with the most recent baseline sce-
nario of the EU Commissions Directorate-General Energy 
and Transport (Mantzos & Capros 2006), the continuation of 
energy policy trends would already lead to a strong primary 
energy effi  ciency increase within the EU25. However, this in-
crease would not be suffi  cient to compensate for a growing 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As a consequence, primary 
energy demand would increase by almost 15 % and import de-
pendency by more than a third. Due to an increased share of 
renewable energy sources (RES) and a switch to natural gas, the 
increase of CO2 emissions is limited to 5 %. Various Member 
States could depart from their current offi  cial stances regarding 
new nuclear capacity. Furthermore, carbon capture and stor-
age is very rapidly getting more R&D funding. If new nuclear 
capacity were built and CCS technology were introduced, the 
emissions would only rise at just over 1 % compared to the 1990 
level (N+ & CCS). 
With regard to climate policy, the BAU scenario assumes that 
the EU25 will accept international emission reduction targets 
of 15 % by 2020 and 30 % by 2030 for the commitment periods 
aft er 20125. Th ese targets are also eff ective in the alternative sce-
narios. Th e consequence is that by 2030 in BAU, the EU25 has 
to buy a total of approximately 35 % quota of its 1990 emission 
levels as tradable emissions from outside EU25. In N+ & CCS, 
this decreases to 32 % and in EE, is down to just over 11 %. 
In RE, more ambitious reduction targets would be feasible 
5. These fi gures are consistent with the Council Decision from May 2005 (EU 
2005). After conclusion of the study in January 2007, the European Commission 
announced reduction targets of 20% - 30%, which were set by the Council in 
March 2007.
and/or the EU25 group would not need to buy emission quota 
from elsewhere (or even be a net seller, in theory).
In the energy effi  ciency (EE) scenario, it is assumed that 
active energy policy gets implemented in all energy demand 
sectors as well as on the energy supply-side (see table 2). In 
eff ect, these policies and measures lead to a doubling of the 
EU25’s primary energy effi  ciency with 10.5 M euros saved per 
ktoe by 2030. Th is is equivalent to energy savings of almost 
20 % compared to the BAU scenario. 
Th e investments for this strategy are supposed to be paid 
from the cost reductions of energy imports and the cost re-
ductions in the EU energy system. Th e latter reductions are, 
fi rst and foremost, linked to lower investments for power plants 
and energy infrastructure. Other analyses by the Wuppertal 
Institute (2006a) show that this would be possible and cost ef-
fi cient. 
Benefi ts of this strategy include the furthering of the achieve-
ment of the following strategic objectives:
CO2 emission reductions within the EU equal to half of the 
20 % reduction lower bound in 2020 as proposed by the Eu-
ropean Commission and continued growth aft er 2020 such 
that the high level of dependency on international emission 
trade, as in the BAU scenario, is substantially reduced.
A modest increase in the share of renewables compared to 
BAU.
A signifi cant reduction of the import dependency, vulner-
ability to high energy prices and possible supply shortages.
Th e renewable energy (RE) scenario describes a much more 
fundamental restructuring, leading towards a highly effi  cient 
and renewable energy based economy. Th e scenario combines 
a very ambitious drive towards energy effi  ciency (11.9 MEur/
ktoe by 2030) with an accelerated expansion strategy for renew-
able energy sources. Renewable energy supply is projected to 
reach a share of 31 % of total primary energy supply in 2030. 
In the RE scenario, a rapid implementation of improvements in 
energy effi  ciency is assumed, as described by Lechtenböhmer et 
al. (2005a/b). Th is development would lead to an acceleration 
of 80 % of energy effi  ciency and, by 2030, to a level of primary 
energy effi  ciency 50 % higher than in the BAU scenario. Final 
energy demand would be reduced by 33 % and electricity de-
mand by almost 24 % in 2030 compared to the BAU scenario. 
Th is strategy depends on the feasibility of accelerating energy 
•
•
•
Scenario
CO2
emissions
(%  1990)
Primary
energy supply
(%  1990)
Import
dependency*)
Nuclear share
of electricity
generation
RES share in
PE supply
Energy efficiency
growth rate (2000
- 2030)
BAU +4.7% +14.6% 64.8% 18.7% 12.2% 1.5%
N
+
& CCS +1.3% +16.4% 62.7% 23.6% 12.0% 1.5%
Energy Efficiency (EE) -18.8% -8.2% 59.8% 15.7% 15.0% 2.2%
Renewable Energy (RE) -45.1% -20.1% 49.1% 16.4% 31.4% 2.7%
Starting point (2000) -3% 47% 14% 6% -
*) As percentage share of primary energy consumption, nuclear fuel imports not included
Source: own calculations, Lechtenböhmer et al. 2006
Table 1: Comparison of the scenarios – changes from 1990 to 2030 and the situation in 2030
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effi  ciency improvement to 2.7 % per year and on the feasibility 
of the projected 34 % share of fl uctuating energies (wind, hydro, 
solar, tidal and wave) in the electricity system. Th e RE scenario, 
therefore, describes an ambitious strategy which is supposed to 
deliver a number of important political targets such as:
Ambitious CO2 emission reductions that ensure fulfi lment 
of the post-Kyoto reduction targets.
Achievement of the renewable energy and CHP capacity 
expansion targets.
A substantial reduction of import dependency, vulnerability 
to high energy prices and possible supply shortages.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICIES AND IMPLIED TRENDS IN THE 
SCENARIOS
In the BAU scenario, energy effi  ciency in all demand sectors 
only improves at approximately historical rates, ranging from 
0.8 % per year in transport to 1.2 % in industry. In the EE sce-
nario, a portfolio of policies (discussed below) boosts this trend 
by about 50 % to -1.2 % in transport and to 1.9 % in industry. A 
remarkable acceleration of energy effi  ciency is to be achieved in 
the tertiary sector. Here, energy intensity improvements can be 
almost doubled to -1.9 % per year (see also table A1 in the An-
nex). In the RE scenario, particular emphasis has been placed 
on further improvement of energy effi  ciency in the transport 
sector and the tertiary sector. It should be stressed that these 
are average fi gures for EU25. Th e improvement potentials per 
sector (in terms of %/year) vary considerably across Member 
States. 
As a corroboration of the Wuppertal Institute model fi nd-
ings for effi  ciency, we refer to a recent study by Daniëls et al 
(2006) based on up-to-date information for the Netherlands. 
Th at study indicates that, for the Netherlands, an annual im-
provement of primary energy effi  ciency of about 2.1 % consti-
tutes the feasible upper limit and is about 1.6 times the current 
pace of improvement. Th e 2.1 % per year can be subdivided 
•
•
•
into 0.5 % for energy conversion and 1.6 % for fi nal energy use. 
Considering that the Netherlands has been relatively active in 
energy saving for well over a decade, it is likely that the coun-
try’s currently feasible pace of effi  ciency improvement is below 
the feasible upper limit for the EU as a whole. Furthermore, 
recent work related to the applicability and instrumental ef-
fi ciency of tradable white certifi cates (Perrels and Tuovinen, 
2007) illustrates that, even for a country like Finland, with tech-
nically effi  cient energy use and rather low energy prices, there 
is still a signifi cant aff ordable energy savings potential that has 
remained untapped thus far. 
Th e pace of energy effi  ciency improvement has to be in-
creased by at least 50 % in comparison to BAU. Th is requires 
a comprehensive policy package that goes beyond energy ef-
fi ciency policy6. Key elements, oft en building on existing di-
rectives, are:
Th e Directive on energy end-use effi  ciency and energy serv-
ices, which could be amended to set mandatory (overall) ef-
fi ciency targets of at least 1 % per year and if need be, can be 
elaborated with the introduction of a tradable white certifi -
cate system (either country level or multi-country level).
Th e Directive on eco-design requirements for energy-using 
products can be used to regulate strong minimum effi  ciency 
standards, e.g. by including the top-runner approach or by 
including external costs into the determination of the lowest 
life-cycle costs.
A new framework Directive on energy labelling, which 
could introduce dynamic effi  ciency classes and cover an 
increasing amount of products, including cars.
Ensuring national implementation and further revisions of 
the Directive on the energy performance of buildings (see 
6. For a broader discussion of policies see Lechtenböhmer et al. 2005a/b and 
Wuppertal Institute (2006). A preliminary discussion of the measures planned in 
the EU Action Plan on Energy Effi ciency can be found in Scholten et al. (2007), 
paper 2,205 in eceee summer study 2007.
•
•
•
•
Year 2000 2010 2020 2030
Scenario BAU BAU EE RE BAU EE RE BAU EE RE
Gross Inland Consumption 1721 1707 1654 1575 1528 1350
(Mtoe / %vs. baseline)
1654 1813
-5.1% -5.8%
1885
-12.3% -16.5%
1895
-19.4% -28.8%
Final Energy Demand 1160 1102 1173 1045 1119 919
(Mtoe / %vs. baseline)
1095 1238
-6.3% -11.0%
1339
-12.3% -21.9%
1370
-18.4% -32.9%
Energy intensity indicators
(1990=100)
Industry
(Energy use / Value added)
83.6 77.3 70.5 68.2 66.7 56.6 53.2 58.5 46.6 42.7
Residential
(Energy use / Private Income)
85.9 80.4 72.9 70.4 70.6 60.0 56.4 62.5 49.6 45.3
Tertiary
(Energy use / Value added)
85.4 79.6 78.3 76.8 70.6 61.8 55.1 63.4 47.4 36.0
Transport
(Energy / GDP)
85.4 93.0 90.0 76.8 79.3 74.1 55.1 66.9 60.3 36.0
Primary energy efficiency
(MEUR/toe)
5.3 6.0 6.4 6.4 7.2 8.3 8.7 8.5 10.5 11.9
CHP indicator
(% of electricity from CHP)
14.4% 16.8% 15.3% 17.8% 21.4% 22.9% 27.9% 24.6% 29.5% 39.6%
Source: own calculations, Lechtenböhmer et al. 2006
Table 2: Energy effi ciency in the EU25 in different scenarios
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also Bowie et al, 2003) as well as inclusion of the electricity 
consumption of the installed equipment in the regulation 
schemes.
Promotion of CHP-based district heating systems, includ-
ing the salvation and refurbishment of these systems in 
various new Member States, the lift ing of barriers to CHP 
in current national legislations and the promotion of mi-
cro-CHP in conjunction with the use of (local) renewable 
energy sources.
Fiscally neutral energy taxation for users outside EU-EUS, 
i.e. by compensating energy tax raises via income tax and 
or social-security levies (a possible alternative for tradable 
white certifi cates, depending on a country’s circumstanc-
es).
Promoting the use of Demand-Side Management (DSM) 
and Demand-Side Bidding, i.e. through guidelines for retail 
tariff  structures. 
Financial incentive programmes in order to accelerate reno-
vation and dynamic improvement of dwellings.
Diff erentiated vehicle purchase taxes and annual road taxes 
by fuel performance and emissions.
Continued voluntary agreements with car makers for fur-
ther emissions reductions of newly sold cars in the post-
Kyoto period (e.g. to 100g CO2 per vehicle km in 2015).
Promotion of spatial planning at the local and national 
level that economizes the need for mobility, introduction 
of congestion taxes where relevant (in conjunction with the 
promotion of adequate public transport) and promotion of 
clean urban logistics (without spurring relocation outside 
the inner city).
Consideration of an emissions reduction scheme for the 
aviation sector or inclusion of civil aviation in the EU Emis-
sion Trade System (provided the use of grandfathering is 
greatly reduced).
Furthermore, the introduction of energy saving funds in all 
Member States following Danish and British examples and 
the defi nition of individual savings targets for energy suppli-
ers under the framework of the energy end-use effi  ciency as 
already present in the UK, Denmark, Italy and Flanders could 
be introduced (see also the fi rst bullet point above). Th e EU 
CO2 Emission Trading Scheme should also be better combined 
with energy effi  ciency policy.
With regards to stationary RES technologies research, devel-
opment and demonstration policies should emphasise syner-
gies with effi  cient building technologies (integrated approach-
es, see EE scenario). A specifi c work topic is foreseen under 
FP7 for renewable heating and cooling. With regard to further 
exploitation of distributed generation (CHP), grid connection 
plays a major role. Work under the FP7 topic of smart energy 
networks and the ETP Smart Grids has to provide solutions 
to this aspect. Th e potential for seasonal storage in conjunc-
tion with sustainable building design also deserves attention in 
European and national programmes for research, development 
and demonstration. 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Particularly aft er 2010, cogeneration must become the major 
investment area in EU electricity generation capacity. Th e fol-
lowing measures are needed
Stronger support for the investments and the technology, 
e.g. by an adequate support of CHP in the EU Emission 
Trade System, by an amendment of the CHP Directive in or-
der to set (mandatory) targets for further periods (2020 EE: 
23 %, RE: 28 %), by a supportive framework for investment 
in industrial and municipal CHP plants, and by precise rules 
and conditions for electricity feed-in, stand-by and residual 
power prices.
Less restrictive planning regulations for small CHP plants in 
decentralised district heating systems, e.g. in new residen-
tial, commercial or industrial developments. 
A scheme for accelerated development, technological im-
provement and market introduction of micro CHP units, 
comprising, for example, the inclusion of CHP friendly rules 
in building codes, soft  loans and other subsidy schemes.
RENEWABLE ENERGIES
In all scenarios, a very active EU policy to promote renew-
able energies is assumed. As the analysis of the existing policy 
shows, broad additional activities are indispensable even in 
the BAU scenario. However, in this scenario, targets are likely 
to be missed and the EU would have to solve the problem of 
fostering a supportive framework for renewable energies in a 
late stage, while many (less favourable) investments will have 
already been made.
In the renewable energy scenario (RE), on the other hand, 
both current targets and ambitious targets for the future (20 % 
in 2020, 35 % in 2030) can be achieved. However, these targets 
require a substantial restructuring of the whole energy system 
and of the economy by using the window of opportunity pre-
sented by the ageing energy system and its subsequent high 
reinvestment need. It appears that current policy for renewable 
energy, in spite of its successes, is not yet in a position to roll out 
the changes needed for the realisation of this scenario. 
Th e RE scenario assumes more than a doubling of growth of 
renewable energy production compared to BAU, while neutral-
ising energy demand growth by intensifi ed energy effi  ciency 
policy (see above). Renewable energy supply reaches a share 
of over 30 % (50 % in electricity generation) in 2030 (see also 
table A2 in the Annex). Th is, however, demands a strict, radical 
and comprehensive policy at EU and Member State level. Poli-
cies could, for example, include binding targets for all Member 
States and for all market segments. 
In addition to BAU developments the RE scenario demands 
more concerted research and technology support eff orts mainly 
in the fi eld of biofuel use, biomass CHP and renewable heat-
ing and cooling technologies. All of these themes are closely 
linked to full exploitation of EU biomass potentials. In order to 
increase the share of renewable energy based electricity beyond 
the level of the BAU scenario, R&D under the FP7 topic, renew-
able electricity, needs to open up the market opportunities for 
geothermal electricity (e.g. Hot-dry-rock).
•
•
•
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RE in power generation 
In the RE scenario, the electricity industry has to use the nec-
essary reinvestment of power generation capacity to achieve 
a complete restructuring. Investments in condensing power 
plants will almost cease, apart from gas fi red CGTs. Instead, 
investments must be made in CHP (biomass and gas-fi red) and 
in greater renewable capacity.
Th is requires clear political decisions and probably stricter 
instruments for redirecting investments (such as restrictive 
permits for new condensing power plants, investment support 
for new biomass fi red CHP, support for market introduction 
of new renewable technologies and development of off shore 
wind farms and solar thermal plants. Additionally, stronger and 
more wide-spread supporting schemes (feed-in tariff s, quotas 
or certifi cates) are needed.
RE in transport sector 
Th e RE scenario almost achieves the target of 5 % biofuels 
in 2010 and leads to a 25 % share in 2030. Th is achievement 
requires strong policy (i.e. binding targets for biofuel shares) 
aimed at a substantial increase of biomass shares in mixed fuels 
(including technical development of motors etc.) and fi nan-
cial incentive schemes to promote market penetration of cars 
running on pure biofuels. Th e promotion of biofuels should 
avoid pitfalls such as guarding the ecological integrity of biofuel 
chains involving developing countries and acknowledging that 
optimalisation may require diversity within the EU (e.g. focus 
on energy crops in Western Europe and on wood residuals in 
Northern Europe). 
Renewable Heat 
Direct biomass use and solar thermal systems will achieve a 
share of 16 % of fi nal energy (without electricity and district 
heat) in stationary applications. Applicable technologies are so-
lar thermal devices including high temperature and solar cool-
ing as well as biomass fi red heating systems and micro CHP 
systems.
Th is implies that specifi c targets and instruments are needed 
for this market segment. Possible instruments include the in-
troduction of RES obligations in building codes, provision of 
soft  loans, combination of RES with building refurbishment, 
feed-in such as fi nancial support schemes and obligations for 
businesses. 
Biomass
Th e strong policy towards renewable energies in the RE sce-
nario will almost fully exploit the EU biomass potential. Th is 
requires the upgrading of indicative targets to binding targets, 
an improved integration of biowaste use and biomass produc-
tion into agricultural policy, the provision of incentives and the 
promotion of the development of processing infrastructures. 
Apart from this, sustainability criteria should be developed and 
implemented to ensure environmentally sound biomass pro-
duction in the EU and in exporting countries.
COMPARISON TO RECENT DG TREN SCENARIOS
DG TREN commissioned a study on long-term energy sce-
narios (Mantzos and Capros, 2006), which included alterna-
tive strategies with high ambition levels for energy saving and 
renewable energy use. Mantzos and Capros (2006) developed 
three scenarios, one effi  ciency scenario, one renewable scenario 
and a so-called “Combined” scenario. Th e outcomes of energy 
effi  ciency are almost equivalent to those of the EE scenario7, 
when considering -12 % (-13 %) primary energy effi  ciency vs. 
BAU in 2020 and -19 % (-20 %) in 2030 (see also table A3 in the 
Annex). Th e expansion of renewable energies in the ‘Combined’ 
scenario by Mantzos et al., is, in absolute terms, similar to the 
RE scenario, yet diff ers from the RE scenario, which allows for 
a substantially larger improvement of energy effi  ciency.
All in all, the scenarios can be ranked according to the fol-
lowing sequence of rising ambitions: EE- high energy effi  ciency 
+ renewable energies as in BAU; ‘Combined‘- intermediate en-
ergy effi  ciency + renewable energy expansion, RE- maximum 
energy effi  ciency + renewable energy expansion.
Economic Benefi ts of Energy Effi ciency
Energy effi  ciency as a core alternative to the BAU scenario de-
livers substantial economic benefi ts. Th e more tangible benefi ts 
are:
Reduced import dependency, which lowers the energy im-
port bills in the EE scenario by 24 billion euros in 2020 and 
by 54 billion euros in 2030, with similar decreases found in 
the RE scenario, in which fossil fuel import costs go down 
by 73 billion euros in 2020 and 140 billion euros in 2030 
(see also table 3 below).
Reduced vulnerability of the EU economy towards energy 
price shocks. A lower energy intensity and a much lower 
cost share for fossil fuels implies that price shocks have 
much less eff ect on the economy (see table 4 and accompa-
nying text above it).
Mitigation of high investment needs in electricity genera-
tion and energy infrastructure by between 1.1 % and 1.5 % 
of total GDP in the EE and by between 1.9 % and 3.3 % in 
the RE scenario. Th is investment, however, will be needed 
for increased investment in energy effi  ciency (see also next 
section).
A 20 to 45 billion euro per year reduction of CO2 emission 
rights costs to be purchased by international emission trad-
ing, depending on the time horizon, scenario and emissions 
target (see table 3).
Th e less tangible, but not necessarily small, benefi ts are:
Due to strongly reduced fossil fuel use, the external costs of 
the energy production and consumption can be expected to 
be signifi cantly lower than in the BAU scenario (i.e. public 
health eff ects).
Increased investment in energy effi  ciency technology in-
stead of infrastructure and fossil energy imports has the 
potential to create new jobs due to higher labour intensity 
and a higher share of domestic value added. Th is eff ect, 
however, may vary signifi cantly across Member States and 
regions. For example, an increasing number of Member 
7. The higher share of renewable electricity generation in the Combined scenario 
leads to higher energy effi ciency at the primary energy level (due to 100 % ef-
fi ciency of renewable power generation). At the level of fi nal energy use, however, 
both scenarios should be quite comparable.
•
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•
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States is facing a shrinking work force and, consequently, 
labour intensive solutions could cause wage infl ation due to 
competition for workers.
Th e EU has the potential to profi t from fi rst mover advan-
tages, as the solutions for higher energy effi  ciency will be 
needed in other countries as well. 
Th e appreciable lowered dependence on imported fossil fu-
els provides leeway in terms of choice of production location 
and tensions on the oil market are, thus, harder to exploit 
for long periods. Th is could cause the need for geopoliti-
cal interventions to drop and, in turn, fewer options for (or 
less reasons for) destabilisations may contribute to a more 
favourable global socio-economic development.
Illustrating the benefi ts of reduced fossil fuel import vulnerabil-
ity
According to Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sánchez (2004), an oil 
price shock of a 100 % increase causes a reduction in GDP 
growth of 2 % to 5 % for various EU countries8. Th e analysis 
indicates that the impact fades away gradually over a period of 
fi ve years. If we assume a 50 % price shock in oil prices (which 
is well within the ranges of experienced shocks), an average 
initial loss in GDP growth of about 1.5 % can be assumed with 
current levels of import dependence. In the BAU scenario, the 
import dependence increases both in relative and absolute 
levels, whereas it goes down in EE and even more in RE. Th e 
8. The size of the interval of shock responsiveness fi gures is partly attributable to 
differences between countries and partly due to testing the relations with various 
estimation methods.
•
•
shock eff ects attenuate commensurate with the reduction in the 
import shares. Th is eff ect gets even stronger aft er correcting 
for the overall reduction in primary (fossil) energy consump-
tion. Th e fi gures below in table 4 should be multiplied by the 
likelihood of a major oil price shock. Th rough 2020, that likeli-
hood is substantial, e.g. 50 %, while for the period up to 2030, it 
gets very likely that at least one major oil price shock will have 
occurred. Table 4 below shows that implementation of the RE 
scenario would mean that the occurrence of an oil price shock 
in or around 2020 would cause a 200 billion euros reduction in 
GDP loss of the EU25 than the same in the BAU scenario. 
Apart from benefi ts, the alternative scenarios cause also extra 
costs due to loss of sales in the energy sector and large amounts 
of incited investments in energy savings and renewable energy 
conversion capacity. In the next section, the net benefi ts are 
presented.
Domestic change management as a risk mitiga-
tion strategy 
Towards a reorientation of investment portfolios in the energy 
system
One of the major challenges of the EE scenario, and especially 
the RE scenario, is the realignment of investments. Th is is a 
challenge in not only terms of policy instrument design and 
market design adaptations, but also in terms of strategic leader-
ship in the rebalancing of interests, which not only maintains 
order but strives to prevent undue harm to particular sectors 
as well. 
Th e current energy system in the EU, though not entirely 
liberalised, aims to maximise medium-term profi ts by build-
2000 2020 2030
Scenario BAU BAU EE RE BAU EE RE
Import dependency (without nuclear imports) 47% 64% 58% 50% 65% 60% 49%
Solids 31% 58% 33% 32% 66% 34% 30%
Oil 82% 93% 92% 91% 94% 93% 90%
natural gas 50% 81% 80% 75% 84% 82% 77%
Biomass 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 0% 20%
Base price scenario
Value of energy imports (bln 00) 301 277 228 358 304 218
Energy costs of end use sectors (bln 00) n.e. 1046 908 794 1096 878 664
in % of GDP 7.7% 6.6% 5.8% 6.8% 5.5% 4.1%
High price scenario
Value of energy imports (bln 00) 499 462 378 623 533 382
Energy costs of end use sectors (bln 00) n.e. 1175 1019 886 1290 1034 769
in % of GDP 8.7% 7.4% 6.5% 8.0% 6.5% 4.7%
Cost for acquisition of tradable CO2 permits (bln 00) n.e. 25 5 (-4) 29 7 (-16)
Source: own calculations, Lechtenböhmer et al. (2006), Price scenarios from Mantzos & Capros (2006)
Table 3: Import dependency, value of energy imports and costs of end use energy and CO2 permits in the EU, 2000 – 2030, aggregated results
shock happening around the year: RE EE
2020 200 93
2030 300 156
Source: Own calculations applying scenario growth rates and elasticities from
Jimenez-Rodriguez (2004)
Table 4: The accumulated (5 year) value of reduced sensitivity to an oil price shock induced reduction in GDP growth (in billions of euros)
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ing an appropriate volume and mix of energy supply capacity. 
It is possible to insert market incentives in the system such as 
demand-side bidding, strict separation of network service pric-
ing from actual energy delivery, emission cap and trade systems 
(provided there is a high level of auctioning), separate whole-
sale pricing of capacity with some diff erential treatments fa-
vouring clean conversion options and auctioning of investment 
subsidies for new renewable energy-based capacity. Without 
explicit transformation policies, however, the energy supply 
system will not pursue truly vigorous energy savings nor will 
it aspire to very high shares of renewable energy forms unless 
these are commercially attractive (as hydro power and biomass 
may be in some cases). 
Energy taxation in combination with tax recycling can help 
to motivate energy saving actions without harming the econo-
my but beyond a certain level, the side eff ects start to weigh in 
quite heavily and eff ectiveness starts to decline. On the other 
hand, if energy suppliers notice that demand for energy is stag-
nating, they may suspend investments and invest only in mini-
mal upkeep of the existing stock since, under stagnating market 
circumstances, an approach of ‘withholding’ produces the best 
opportunities for short to medium-term profi t maximisation. 
As a consequence, the pace of renewal slows down consider-
ably and, hence, the scope of reducing the emission intensity 
of the energy supply becomes drastically worse. Another con-
sequence could be further concentration of the capacity into 
fewer hands, i.e. increase of monopoly power.
Instruments that provide incentives to the energy supply sec-
tor are needed for continued investment in clean conversion 
capacity and in the capacity to save energy, despite the fact that 
the (physical) volume of their energy sales is diminishing. Th e 
competitiveness of markets could be maintained by promoting 
building and energy technologies that pursue the joint optimi-
sation of energy savings and use of local renewable resources, 
both in the built environment as well as in various industries. In 
the built environment, for example, technologies such as pas-
sive sunlight, solar collectors, PV-panels, natural ventilation, 
biomass run micro-CHP, high insulation standards, heat recov-
ery and seasonal storage of surplus heat could be utilised. Th e 
embodied energy and emissions of building materials could 
be accounted for as well. Incentive structures should stimu-
late energy companies to take part in investments in the built 
environment and certain industries, with the aim of creating 
new clean-energy resources, allowing for energy savings while 
enabling energy companies to stay in business. 
In addition to eff ective policies that reorient a signifi cant part 
of energy related investment fl ows from the supply to the de-
mand-side, there are also timing and uncertainty aspects that 
must be taken into consideration. In the EE scenario and par-
ticularly in the RE scenario, the unit-cost of energy production 
capacity (or conversely, savings capacity) increases. Th e over-
all eff ect may be that the up-front costs rise while the revenue 
base narrows. Assuming that the main features of the liberal-
ised market are retained, this means that there is uncertainty 
as whether the energy prices will rise enough to compensate 
for the lower volumes. Another uncertainty is that the ben-
efi ts of a more stable economy, thanks to lower sensitivity to 
price shocks, are uncertain in terms of size, time-profi le and the 
particular sectors in which benefi ts accrue. Mixed with these 
uncertainties are questions of how well a new policy incentive 
structure will succeed in reallocating the investment fl ows and 
to what extent changes in market power may cause new con-
cerns about new concentrations, e.g. due to a growing domi-
nance of big players from the fi nancial sector.
What do the benefi ts and costs add up to?
As previously mentioned, the substantial changes and reduc-
tions in energy demand enable a gradual release of funds, origi-
nally meant for the supply-side, for reallocation to other pur-
poses. Th e following items make up possible sources of ‘fund 
release’:
Energy imports (mainly constituting a reduction in costs for 
the energy conversion sector, see table 3).
Reduced supply capacity investments known as the volume 
eff ect (mainly a reduction in costs for the energy conver-
sion sector).
Reduced cost of emission trade (see table 3).
Reduced energy acquisition cost for end-users (a cumulative 
eff ect containing the aforementioned issues, see table 3)
Ancillary benefi ts of other reduced emissions (not quanti-
fi ed in this study).
Implied benefi ts of more stable economic growth (occur-
rence and timing uncertain, see table 4)
It was illustrated in section “Economic Benefi ts of Energy 
Effi  ciency” that the ‘released funds’ add up to considerable 
amounts, although the ambitious targets for energy savings and 
elevated use of renewable energy sources also entail signifi cant 
costs such as:
More expensive energy supply capacity or the unit-cost ef-
fect, meaning that a part of the small-scale, installed capac-
ity is more expensive per MW than the original capacity 
foreseen in BAU (a signifi cant cost for the energy supply 
sector, but growing self-generation in end-use sectors im-
plies also extra need for funds among end-users).
More expensive end-use equipment, meaning that, despite 
learning eff ects, various types of equipment and, possibly, 
various kinds of buildings, will get more expensive due to 
more embodied human capital (knowledge) and high-tech 
materials (typically a cost for infrastructure and equipment 
builders, as well as end-use sectors, not including policies 
that involve the energy supply sector).
Induced cost eff ects in some sectors following from higher 
unit-cost of energy and from land use eff ects of expanded 
biomass cultivation (in some sectors such as those with lim-
ited energy saving options, the higher unit-cost of energy 
will be transferred to the prices of products and services 
and similarly, the elevated demand for biofuel input may 
increase the cost of wood, land and some food staples).
Expanding energy R&D and precipitating market uptake 
(i.e. pilot project support) to ensure continued supply of af-
fordable energy saving and renewable energy technology. 
Table 5 summarises the estimated pros and cons discussed 
above. Th e fi gures denote a diff erence as compared to the BAU 
•
•
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strategy. Th e table shows a preliminary and fairly conservative 
estimate in which additional investments for more energy ef-
fi cient technology along with the higher costs of the more ex-
pensive (renewable) power plants can be covered by the cost 
savings in fi nal energy consumption. Th e total net benefi ts 
could even amount to as much as 1100 billion euros for the 
scenario period as a whole. Here, the EE scenario seems to be 
more advantageous because of the cheaper cost of investment 
in energy effi  ciency and the renunciation of investment in the 
more expensive renewable energy supply. When the benefi ts 
of a reduction in oil price sensitivity are added to the balance, 
the advantage of the alternative strategies becomes even clear-
er. Th e diff erence between the EE and the more ambitious RE 
strategy, however, lessens as higher effi  ciency and expanded, 
domestic, renewable energy supplies deliver higher benefi ts 
with regards to world energy supply risks. It seems, therefore, 
that the advantages of both strategies are virtually always suffi  -
cient to cover the additional transaction costs delivering energy 
effi  ciency, restructuring the EU energy system and covering ad-
ditional R&D needs. With respect to the presented cost eff ects, 
it should be stressed that no overall macro-economic impact 
assessment has been carried out that could test whether it mat-
ters (or the extent to which it matters) if energy end-users or 
the energy supply industry experience an initial reduction in 
value added. 
Conclusion 
A radical change towards a sustainable energy system is, on 
the one hand, a challenging strategy and, therefore, constitutes 
risks of failure both with respect to ecological targets and to 
conditions covering the other sustainability dimensions such 
as economy and social well being. In this respect, the scenarios 
discussed in this paper illustrate that substantial increases in 
energy effi  ciency and in renewable energy use do not have to 
cost more to society than a continuation of Business as Usual 
approaches. 
On the other hand, a status quo (as embodied by BAU) is 
oft en, deceptively considered as safer, although it, too, implies 
risks. In the cases described in this paper, the risk of BAU lies 
principally in its failure to achieve suffi  cient reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions. Th is type of strategy (like BAU and 
N+ & CCS in this study) tends to rely predominantly on optimi-
sation of large and medium-scale energy conversion technol-
ogy.9 Yet, while not denying the useful role of these advanced 
supply-side technologies (not the least in developing countries 
with fast growing economies), the scenario discussion provides 
reasons for serious concerns about the amount of emissions re-
ductions and fossil fuel decoupling that these BAU approaches 
can eventually deliver. Furthermore, apart from missing strate-
gic ecological objectives, the failure to reduce fossil fuel import 
dependence and the large dependence on emission trading 
point at increasing economic vulnerability as time passes by 
in the BAU scenario.
Up to now, BAU type strategies are oft en still preferred as the 
economic implications of alternative scenarios are perceived 
to be problematic. Th e scenarios discussed here illustrate that, 
when policy making starts to require the inclusion of longer 
term eff ects, the extra eff orts for ecological sustainability do not 
have to lead to inferior economic performance. Basically, the 
savings on energy acquisition cost and on reduced investments 
for energy conversion capacity release suffi  cient purchasing 
power for extra eff orts in energy effi  ciency and renewable en-
ergy use. What remains, is the challenge of initiating the appro-
priate reallocation of the funds without causing undue harm 
to any sector. Th is is an undeniably diffi  cult task. Th is paper 
has, however, indicated that there is a portfolio of both existing 
and new policy instruments available, although further devel-
opments regarding policy instruments, funding mechanisms 
and strategic governance are needed. Even in the BAU scenario, 
however, large managerial challenges would have to be faced. 
In that respect, we claim that the EE and RE scenarios will 
pave the way for a swap of risks from hardly controllable exter-
nal relations to domestic change management. Th ey thus under-
score that the recent energy strategy proposed by the European 
Commission (COM 2007) and concluded by the Council in 
March 200710 which targets at a 20 % CO2 emissions reduction, 
9. We do not claim that those options should be forgotten. For example, if the 
technology became mature, carbon capture and storage could provide interesting 
prospects when applied to power stations running on biomass.
10. Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (8/9 March 2007)
Whole period 2010 – 2030 Base oil price High oil price
Cost items EE RE EE RE
Energy acquisition costs for end-users (-/- 35% value added ESI)*) -1820 -3426 -2340 -3861
Extra R&D efforts, notably, for energy efficiency & renewables 50 70 50 70
Investments in energy savings **) 1340 3340 1340 3340
Total 1 -430 -16 -950 -451
Benefits of the reduction of oil price sensitivity -156 -300 -156 -300
Total 2 -586 -316 -1106 -751
Negative values = benefits, positive values = costs
*) Corrected for the overall loss in gross value added in the energy supply sector (~ 35%)
**) Estimated based on cost information of the Eurowhitecert study (Perrels et al. 2007). An EU wide average unit-cost is used for
a given fraction of the potential and the fraction in RE is higher (=100%) than in EE, hence a higher average unit-cost. Includes the
transport sector.
Source: own calculations; N.B. apart from the correction for loss of value added of the energy supply sector, no
other induced economic effects have been considered (that would require a detailed CGE model covering all
member states).
Table 5: Accumulated net macro-level cost differences of EE and RE compared to BAU
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20 % renewable energy generation and 20 % energy savings by 
2020 (or more or less a strategy as outlined in the RE scenario) 
is heading in the right direction and that the huge challenges 
posed by the realisation of these targets to policymakers and 
society are worthwhile and probably substantially smaller than 
the oft en overlooked challenges imposed by BAU. 
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BAU EE RE
Industry -1.2% -1.9% -2.2%
Residential -1.1% -1.8% -2.1%
Tertiary -1.0% -1.9% -2.8%
Transport -0.8% -1.2% -2.8%
overall average -1.1% -1.7% -2.4%
Source: own calculations, Lechtenböhmer et al. 2006
Res Share Values for
2030
total primary
energy use
electricity
generation
CHP generation transport fuels heat sector
BAU 28% 14%
N+
12%
27% 13%
6% 14%
EE 15% 36% 15% 7% 11%
RE 31% 50% 35% 26% 20%
Res Share Values 2005 16% 5% 0,9% 10%
Res Share Values 2000 6% 15% 5% 0,1% 9%
Source: Lechtenböhmer et al. 2006
Combined DG TREN EE RE
2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030
Primary energy % vs. BAU -13 -20 -12 -19 -16 -29
Mtoe 325 394 186 229 315 418Renewable
energy use % 20 26 11 15 20 31
Mt 2969 2670 3122 2956 2795 2015
CO2 emissions
% vs. 1990 -21.4 -29.3 -17.3 -21.7 -26.0 -46.6
Mtoe 1107 1020 942 770Import
dependency % 57 59 58 60 50 49
Source: own calculations, Lechtenböhmer et al. (2006), Mantzos & Capros (2006)
Table A.1: Energy intensity improvement by demand sector in different scenarios, 2000 – 2030
Table A.2: Share of renewable energy sources in various energy use categories in different scenarios, by 2030
Table A.3: Comparison with DG TREN Combined high effi ciency & renewable scenario
Annex – Additional information on scenario trends and assumptions
